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I. INTRODUCTION 
President Trump has yet to make good on his campaign promise to build a 
border wall along the United States-Mexico border.1 In the meantime, though, 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2020, Moritz College of Law. 
 1 See Peter Baker & Glenn Thrush, Trump Is ‘Not Happy’ with Border Deal, but 
Doesn’t Say if He Will Sign It, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/02/12/us/politics/border-wall-deal.html [https://perma.cc/8UGQ-UK7D] (noting 
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his administration has been building legal walls.2 Stalled negotiations over the 
fate of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), the lift of Temporary 
Protected Status (TPS) for natives of certain countries, Attorney General case 
certification in twelve cases, and the now-rescinded “child separation policy” 
have all contributed to President Trump’s campaign-promised overhaul of 
United States immigration law.3 While public backlash has stalled some of these 
measures,4 the executive branch has nevertheless employed its authority to 
shape policy in a variety of ways.5 One way includes the creation of binding 
precedent in immigration law by the Attorney General under the referral 
authority, which permits the Attorney General to adjudicate individual 
immigration cases and set policy unilaterally.6 
The Attorney General’s use of the referral authority historically has been 
the subject of much controversy, and this holds true in the present context.7 
When an Attorney General uses the referral authority, criticism generally 
follows and stems from the significant potential for an Attorney General’s abuse 
of this authority.8 Specifically, critics argue that the Attorney General sets 
executive policy through a process that lacks procedural safeguards protecting 
                                                                                                                     
that President Trump capitulated to ending the government shutdown without receiving 
funding for the border wall at issue).  
 2 David Bier, Trump Builds His Wall Against Legal Immigrants, HILL (July 19, 2018), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/397873-trump-builds-his-wall-
against-legal-immigrants [https://perma.cc/AN7Q-3TFN] (compiling the immigration 
polices the Trump Administration has used to curb both legal and illegal immigration).  
 3 Sarah Almukhtar et al., How Trump’s Policy Change Separated Migrant Children 
from Their Parents, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2018/06/20/us/border-children-separation.html [https://perma.cc/BW7E-H89B]; Catherine 
E. Shoichet, Immigration, Trump and You: 5 Things Happening Now, and Why They Matter, 
CNN (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/09/politics/immigration-trump-
explainer/index.html [https://perma.cc/L59S-LV2G]; see infra Part III.  
 4 See Scott Clement, The Public Rejected Trump’s Child-Separation Policy, but a 
Majority Supports His Push to Detain Families Until Court Hearings, WASH. POST (July 13, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/07/13/the-public-rejected 
-trumps-child-separation-policy-but-a-majority-supports-his-push-to-detain-families-until 
-court-hearings/?utm_term=.15828aed8576 [https://perma.cc/S6A2-YARS].  
 5 See Bier, supra note 2.  
 6 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(h) (2018). See generally Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick 
Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Policy through the Attorney General’s 
Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841 (2016) (providing a foundational view of the 
referral authority written by former U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and Office of 
Immigration Litigation Attorney Patrick Glen). For clarity, the Attorney General’s referral 
authority is also often referred to as “case certification.” 
 7 See, e.g., Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 847 (acknowledging “that the referral 
authority is not without its critics, who have . . . focused on the lack of guidelines or clearly 
established processes utilized by the Department of Justice when a case is referred to and 
decided by the Attorney General”).  
 8 Laura S. Trice, Adjudication by Fiat: The Need for Procedural Safeguards in 
Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1766, 1767 (2010).  
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due process and provides for inadequate neutrality and transparency in the 
adjudicatory context.9 Generally, administrations rarely use the referral 
authority as a tool to implement policy.10 The Trump Administration, though, 
has already used the referral authority twelve times.11 The prevalence of its use 
is striking when compared with its use under the Obama Administration, which 
used the referral authority only four times throughout its eight years.12 Also 
divergent is the nature of the cases referred under the Trump Administration and 
the issues decided.13 Unlike many of his predecessors, after referring the case 
to himself, Attorney General Sessions essentially altered the issue originally on 
appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board).14 Attorney General 
Sessions not only used the referral authority more often, but also garnered 
attention for the way that he used the referral authority.15 
To be sure, as a means for effectuating policy, the referral authority is both 
statutorily based and arguably effective.16 The Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) grants wide-ranging authority to the Attorney General by allowing him 
to direct the administration, interpretation, and enforcement of immigration 
policy.17 Immigration judges (IJs) usually first adjudicate removal proceedings 
and the Board reviews their decisions, but the Attorney General can also 
                                                                                                                     
 9 Id. at 1768; see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (affirming that 
noncitizens present in the United States are entitled to due process whether having a “lawful, 
unlawful, temporary, or permanent” presence). 
 10 See Sanchez-Penunuri v. Longshore, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1149 (D. Colo. 2013) 
(“[A]lthough he rarely uses this power, the Attorney General is the final arbiter of the 
immigration agency’s interpretation of a statute . . . .”); see infra Part II.  
 11 See generally Thomas & Thompson, 27 I. & N. Dec. 674 (A.G. 2019); Castillo-Perez, 
27 I. & N. Dec. 495 (A.G. 2018); L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 494 (A.G. 2018); Negusie, 27 I. 
& N. Dec. 481 (A.G. 2018); M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 476 (A.G. 2018); M-G-G-, 27 I. & N. 
Dec. 469 (A.G. 2018); S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 462 (A.G. 2018); L-A-B-R-, 27 I. 
& N. Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018); A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. 
Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018); E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226 (A.G. 2018).  
 12 Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 858.  
 13 See Jeffrey S. Chase, The AG’s Certifying of BIA Decisions, OPINIONS/ANALYSIS 
IMMIGR. L. (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/3/29/the-ags-
certifying-of-bia-decisions [https://perma.cc/4TEL-VD28] (stating that “Sessions’ use 
of certification thus far is unique in his redetermination of what the case he chooses is even 
about”).  
 14 See id. (collecting examples of cases in which Sessions has altered the issue on 
appeal).  
 15 See, e.g., David Hausman, How Jeff Sessions Is Attacking Immigration Judges and 
Due Process Itself, ACLU (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/ 
deportation-and-due-process/how-jeff-sessions-attacking-immigration-judges [https: 
//perma.cc/U39A-TCNS].  
 16 Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 897 (arguing that Attorney General referral 
authority is an effective means of setting executive federal immigration policy).  
 17 See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g) (2009); Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 850 (“It is the 
Attorney General who was statutorily charged, and remains charged together with the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, with the administration and enforcement 
of the immigration laws.”).  
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adjudicate individual immigration cases.18 The Board, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary, or the Attorney General himself can refer 
a case for Attorney General review.19 This process allows an Attorney General 
to become the decision maker and further federal immigration policy as 
envisioned by the executive branch.20 This authority also provides an Attorney 
General with the opportunity to resolve wide-ranging issues and affect cases 
beyond the particular case certified.21 Still, the Attorney General, a political 
appointee charged to enforce executive policies, can hardly be expected to play 
the role of a neutral adjudicator.22 Thus, despite an Attorney General’s statutory 
charge to enforce immigration law, there exists an inherent and severe lack of 
neutrality and procedural safeguards which ultimately demonstrate that the 
referral authority is an inappropriate method to adjudicate individual 
immigration cases.  
This Note addresses the Attorney General’s referral authority over 
immigration cases and its use under the Trump Administration. To illustrate and 
understand the referral authority, Part II of this Note considers the statutory 
background of the INA that grants an Attorney General the ability to adjudicate 
cases through the referral authority, as well as its use throughout history. Part 
III examines the use of the referral authority under the Trump Administration, 
along with the nature of the cases selected for review. Finally, Part IV suggests 
amending the INA by relegating immigration policymaking by an Attorney 
General to notice-and-comment rulemaking only, thus ensuring that the 
adjudications of individual immigration cases are fair.  
II. BACKGROUND ON THE REFERRAL AUTHORITY AND ITS USE 
In order to understand the drastic shift in the Trump Administration’s use 
of the referral authority, it is first necessary to understand the statutory basis for 
the referral authority, its use by previous administrations, and its well-
established criticisms. This Part provides this overview of the referral authority 
by beginning with its creation leading up to its use under the Obama 
                                                                                                                     
 18 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b), (h) (2018).  
 19 Id. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i)–(iii).  
 20 Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 846 (considering the referral authority to be within 
“the executive branch’s scope of action in advancing its conception of immigration policy in 
the face of a recalcitrant Congress”).  
 21 See id. at 860.  
 22 See Chase, supra note 13 (arguing that the DOJ is “enforcement-minded” and “has 
never really grasped the concept of independent decision makers existing under its 
jurisdiction”); Ted Hesson, Sessions Signals Immigration Crackdown: ‘This Is the Trump 
Era,’ POLITICO (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/jeff-sessions-
immigration-crackdown-237109 [https://perma.cc/9Y58-K5NS] (noting that the policies of 
the Trump Administration represent an “aggressive approach [that] could help lock down 
the border, but it could also lead to the arrest of valid asylum seekers, depending on how the 
new plans are implemented”).  
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Administration. Consideration of the referral authority’s use under the Trump 
Administration is analyzed in the following Part.23 
A. The Statutory Basis for the Attorney General’s Referral Authority 
The INA gives broad authority to the Attorney General to implement the 
statute.24 The statute enables the Attorney General to direct the administration, 
interpretation, and enforcement of immigration policy through the INA.25 
Pursuant to this authority, the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) was 
created by regulation in 1940.26 The Board serves as an appellate body charged 
with reviewing appeals of individual immigration decisions made by IJs over 
“removal determinations, requests for discretionary relief, and asylum 
applications.”27 Through its review, the Board can issue precedential decisions 
over issues that bind the administration and adjudication of immigration law.28 
Still, the Board has no statutory authority of its own, and it serves as a 
delegate of the Attorney General.29 Although a delegate of the Attorney 
General, by regulation the Board is granted as much authority over discretionary 
decisions as the Attorney General.30 Therefore, as long as the regulations 
remain, the Board has a degree of independence in decision making.31 Indeed, 
members of the Board “shall exercise their independent judgment and discretion 
in considering and determining . . . cases.”32 Essentially, this regulation 
attempts to prevent the Attorney General from “sidestep[ping] the Board.”33 
However, aside from adjudication by the Board, the Attorney General can 
directly adjudicate individual immigration cases through use of the referral 
authority.34 As for the cases referred to the Attorney General, the statute does 
not mandate any criteria for a case to be reviewed by the Attorney General; it 
                                                                                                                     
 23 See infra Part III.  
 24 See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g) (2009). 
 25 Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 841, 850. 
 26 Regulations Governing Departmental Organization and Authority, 5 Fed. Reg. 3502, 
3503 (Sept. 4, 1940) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 90).  
 27 Katie R. Eyer, Administrative Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 
647, 668–69 (2008).  
 28 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d) (2018); see Eyer, supra note 27, at 670 (quoting 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(g) (2007)).  
 29 Eyer, supra note 27, at 669. Despite being created by regulation, the Board has 
remained a relatively “stable” body for more than seven decades. Id. 
 30 United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266 (1954) (“In 
unequivocal terms the regulations delegate to the Board discretionary authority as broad as 
the statute confers on the Attorney General; the scope of the Attorney General’s discretion 
became the yardstick of the Board’s.”). 
 31 See id. at 267; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (2018).  
 32 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (2018). 
 33 Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. at 267. 
 34 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2018) (“The Board shall refer to the Attorney General for 
review of its decisions all cases that . . . [t]he Attorney General directs the Board to refer to 
him.”).  
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merely specifies who may refer a case.35 The Board, the DHS Secretary, or the 
Attorney General himself can refer cases for review.36 Attorney General review 
is performed de novo and review is not limited by the decisions in the underlying 
proceedings.37 This process allows the Attorney General to become the decision 
maker and further the Administration’s immigration policy.38  
B. Use of the Referral Authority by Prior Administrations  
Generally, since its inception, referral authority use by attorneys general has 
decreased in number, and the substance of its use has changed as well.39 The 
following table provides data on the total number of times the referral authority 
has been used under each administration.  
 
Table 1. Referral Authority’s Use by Prior Administrations 
(continuing on to the next page) 
 
Year Range (Administration)40 Total Use 
1942–1945 (Franklin D. Roosevelt) 111 
1945–1953 (Harry S. Truman) 296 
1953–1961 (Dwight D. Eisenhower) 10 
1961–1963 (John F. Kennedy) 11 
1963–1969 (Lyndon B. Johnson) 5 
1969–1974 (Richard M. Nixon)41 3 
1974–1977 (Gerald R. Ford)42 1 
                                                                                                                     
 35 Id.; see also Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: 
The Déjà Vu of Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 484 
n.35 (2007) (“The regulation does not specify any substantive criteria for referral. Rather, it 
delineates those who have authority to invoke this mechanism of policy control.”).  
 36 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i)–(iii) (2018). 
 37 INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 327 (1992) (holding that the Attorney General is not 
limited by the underlying decision of the Board but can instead find an independent basis for 
his decision); A-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 774, 779 n.4 (A.G. 2005). Indeed, the referral authority 
grants the Attorney General very broad authority. Trice, supra note 8, at 1773. “[T]he 
Attorney General [has] discretion to review any of the 30,000 [Board] cases decided 
annually,” and, “when he does so, he views his review power as plenary, extending to de 
novo review of law and facts and unconstrained by regulations that bind the [Board].” Id.  
 38 Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 847. But see Trice, supra note 8, at 1773–74 
(arguing that “politically driven decisionmaking” leaves those individuals filing asylum or 
withholding claims ultimately vulnerable).  
 39 Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 857.  
 40 Id. at 857–58; The Presidents Timeline, WHITE HOUSE HIST. ASS’N, https://www 
.whitehousehistory.org/the-presidents-timeline [https://perma.cc/8RLU-CC5F]. 
 41 See generally Hernandez, 14 I. & N. Dec. 608 (A.G. 1974); Janati-Ataie, 14 I. & N. 
Dec. 216 (A.G. 1972); Lee, 13 I. & N. Dec. 214 (A.G. 1969). 
 42 See generally Stultz, 15 I. & N. Dec. 362 (A.G. 1975). 
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1977–1981 (Jimmy Carter)43 1 
1981–1989 (Ronald Reagan)44 1 
1989–1993 (George H.W. Bush)45 1 
1993–2001 (William J. Clinton)46 3 
2001–2009 (George W. Bush) 16 
2009–2017 (Barack Obama)47 4 
2017–present (Donald J. Trump)48 12 
 
The shift in use is largely attributable to a difference in use by particular 
presidential administrations, a change in the type of substantive review over 
each case by the Attorney General, and who is referring the case to the Attorney 
General.49 First, a change in the type of review by attorneys general may have 
also contributed to the overall downward trend in the number of cases 
reviewed.50 Early decisions often attached little reasoning, and thus could be 
performed quickly.51 However, beginning in the 1950s, the Attorneys Generals’ 
decisions on referred cases became increasingly more “independently reasoned” 
and they tended to serve more significant ends than mere summary review.52 In 
                                                                                                                     
 43 See generally Cantu, 17 I. & N. Dec. 190 (A.G. 1978). 
 44 See generally Belenzo, 17 I. & N. Dec. 374 (A.G. 1981). 
 45 See generally Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262 (A.G. 1991). 
 46 Under the Clinton Administration, in addition to the three issued decisions, fourteen 
orders were given by the Attorney General. Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 858.  
 47 Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 858. However, some commentators argue that, 
though the referral authority was not often used under the Obama Administration, it instead 
used other tools to advance its immigration policies, such as executive orders or executive 
branch memorandum. See id. at 846. Particularly, President Obama issued DACA as an 
executive branch memorandum and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful 
Permanent Residents (DAPA) by an executive action. See 2014 Executive Actions on 
Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/archive/2014-
executive-actions-immigration [https://perma.cc/4L44-64AC] (listing a series of executive 
actions announced by President Obama on November 20, 2014). 
 48 See generally Thomas & Thompson, 27 I. & N. Dec. 674 (A.G. 2019); Castillo-Perez, 
27 I. & N. Dec. 495 (A.G. 2018); L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 494 (A.G. 2018); Negusie, 27 I. 
& N. Dec. 481 (A.G. 2018); M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 476 (A.G. 2018); M-G-G-, 27 I. & N. 
Dec. 469 (A.G. 2018); S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 462 (A.G. 2018); L-A-B-R-, 27 I. 
& N. Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018); A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. 
Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018); E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226 (A.G. 2018). 
 49 Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 857–59.  
 50 Id. at 858 (“[T]he quality of the Attorney General’s decisions have been greater in 
recent years, even if those decisions have been less frequent, tending towards independently 
reasoned, articulated, and published opinions on the merits of the case.”).  
 51 Harry N. Rosenfield, Necessary Administrative Reforms in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 145, 157 (1958) (“Often the Attorney 
General’s action is a peremptory ‘disapproved’ or ‘approved,’ without any clue to the alien 
as to the ‘why’s’ and ‘wherefores.’ And sometimes the Attorney General will first approve 
or disapprove the Board’s decision and then withdraw his action or reverse himself, in both 
instances without any reason assigned.”).  
 52 Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 859. 
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fact, these decisions resolved larger legal issues, they created policy or 
established new standards for future cases, they involved issues of foreign 
policy, and, in some instances, the rejection of a referral effectively acted as 
acceptance or a stay on certain issues.53 The focus, then, has been on cases 
“whose resolution would have continuing importance—the decision of a legal 
question that would potentially affect many cases or the setting of policy that 
would likewise have significant effects beyond the case at issue.”54 This type of 
review necessarily is more time consuming, and thus limits the number of cases 
that can be reviewed under the referral authority by an Attorney General.  
Second, in addition to the more substantive review slowing the number of 
referred cases, the source of referred cases has also changed.55 Early decisions 
were mostly referred to the Attorney General by the Board.56 The Immigration 
and Nationality Service (INS), though referring less than the Board, still referred 
a significant amount of cases to the Attorney General also.57 Cases certified 
directly by the Attorney General lagged behind both the Board’s and the INS’s 
referrals.58 However, recently, most cases are self-certified by the Attorney 
General, with DHS providing some and the Board providing very few.59 The 
downward trend mirrors the overall decrease in the use of the referral authority 
by the Attorney General.60 Though, this may also be partly attributable to a 
regulatory change that made mandatory referral in certain instances merely 
discretionary.61 While a variety of sources may have contributed to a decrease 
in the use of referral authority—the inclinations of a particular administration, 
the type of review, or the source of referral—the number of cases reviewed by 
the Attorney General under the referral authority has generally decreased over 
time. 
                                                                                                                     
 53 Id. at 861, 886.  
 54 Id. at 860.  
 55 Id. at 859.  
 56 Id.  
 57 Id.; see Did You Know?: The INS No Longer Exists, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. 
SERVICES (Apr. 13, 2011), https://www.uscis.gov/archive/blog/2011/04/did-you-know-ins-
no-longer-exists [https://perma.cc/6NAT-PQ7R] (“[S]ince March 1, 2003 . . . most INS 
functions were transferred from the Department of Justice to three new components within 
the newly formed Department of Homeland Security. USCIS is one of those three 
components. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) are the other two.”).  
 58 Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 859.  
 59 Id. (noting that, as of 2016, fourteen cases were self-certified by the Attorney 
General, eleven were referred by DHS, and only one case was referred to the Attorney 
General by the Board).  
 60 Id.  
 61 Id. at 85960; see 8 C.F.R. § 90.12 (1940) (mandating referral to the Attorney 
General over cases with a “question of difficulty” and “in any case in which a dissent has 
been recorded”).  
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C. Common Criticisms of the Referral Authority  
Despite the decreasing use of the referral authority, this process is routinely 
criticized when it is used.62 Three of the most prevalent critiques include (1) the 
threatened lack of neutrality by a politically appointed adjudicator; (2) the 
removal of a decision from what might be considered a neutral adjudicative 
body with subject matter expertise to instead be decided by a political 
appointee;63 and (3) the absence of statutory or regulatory provisions 
safeguarding the due process of noncitizens under use of the referral authority.64 
First, as stated above, the Attorney General is a political appointee.65 The 
Attorney General serves under the executive branch and is thus charged with 
carrying out the policy directives of the administration.66 While the obvious 
function of an administrative agency is to carry out the political agenda of the 
executive branch, the perception of political policy in adjudication raises the 
question of fairness in the decision-making.67 Indeed, when the Attorney 
General carries out adjudications, it may “be seen as objectionable because it 
conflicts with a core value of our legal system: that disputes are resolved by an 
impartial adjudicator who has no interest in the outcome.”68 Finally, when an 
Attorney General or administration is on their way out, they often issue many 
significant decisions as a last-ditch effort to put their policy in place.69 Thus, 
this concern that the Attorney General lacks neutrality is not unfounded.  
Second, when an Attorney General certifies a case, he takes the decision 
from the Board and leaves it with little decisional independence.70 Many agency 
adjudicators are “specialists” and “selected because their background and 
                                                                                                                     
 62 See Chase, supra note 13.  
 63 See id.  
 64 Trice, supra note 8, at 1768; see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) 
(affirming that noncitizens present in the United States are entitled to due process whether 
having a “lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent” presence).  
 65 Chase, supra note 13. 
 66 See id.  
 67 Margaret H. Taylor, Midnight Agency Adjudication: Attorney General Review of 
Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 18, 19 (2016); Elise 
Foley, Jeff Sessions Has Power to Shape Asylum Policy. He Could Be Gearing Up to Use it 
to Deny Relief to Domestic Violence Victims., HUFFPOST (Mar. 16, 2018), https:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sessions-asylum-deportations_us_5aa9729fe4b0600b 
82ff93b4 [https://perma.cc/MP3A-UY7Q] (“‘Even apart from Jeff Sessions, I’ve never 
liked the idea that the attorney general can review a decision of the [Board] at all,’ said 
Stephen Legomsky, a former lead counsel for U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
under the Obama administration. ‘When the attorney general substitutes his decision for that 
of the [Board], it would be analogous to a prosecutor in a criminal case deciding the case.’”).  
 68 Taylor, supra note 67, at 19.  
 69 Id. at 20 (referring to this process as “midnight agency adjudications,” in which “an 
agency head . . . refers a controversial issue to himself and renders a decision upending 
agency precedent on his way out the door”).  
 70 See Taylor, supra note 35, at 480. 
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expertise suits them to hear a particular type of case.”71 Indeed, in the 
immigration context, IJs and the Board possess “subject matter expertise.”72 
Still, as employees of the DOJ, an agency tasked with carrying out executive 
policy, a similar concern over their neutrality arises.73 Board members are 
appointed by the Attorney General but do not have a fixed tenure and serve at 
the pleasure of the Attorney General.74  
Finally, both the lack of neutrality by the Attorney General and the Board’s 
lack of independence create serious due process concerns for those individuals 
whose cases are being heard.75 Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not just apply to citizens, but all 
noncitizens in the country “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, 
temporary, or permanent,” as well.76 Currently, though, Attorney General 
review under referral authority is not subject to any “particular process,” or even 
the minimal requirement of giving the parties “notice and an opportunity for 
meaningful participation in the review process.”77 Without even minimal 
process, decision-making lacks neutrality and transparency, thus endangering a 
noncitizen’s due process rights.78  
III. THE REFERRAL AUTHORITY’S USE UNDER THE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION 
Under the Trump Administration, the Attorneys General have certified 
twelve cases for review by referral authority.79 This section will consider the 
                                                                                                                     
 71 Id. at 481.  
 72 Chase, supra note 13. For instance, the author, Jeffrey S. Chase, himself 
demonstrates that many adjudicators employed by the Board have expertise in United States 
immigration law. Id. Chase is presently an immigration lawyer and was formerly an 
“Immigration Judge and Senior Legal Advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals.” Id.  
 73 See Taylor, supra note 35, at 480–81 (noting that agency adjudication of cases may 
be carried out by “agency adjudicators” subject to oversight by “agency heads”). 
 74 Maurice A. Roberts, The Board of Immigration Appeals: A Critical Appraisal, 15 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 34 (1977).  
 75 Trice, supra note 8, at 1768.  
 76 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).  
 77 Trice, supra note 8, at 1773.  
 78 Id. at 1775 (stating that, in some cases, “the Attorney General has failed to provide 
adequate opportunities for interested parties to brief or argue the issues under consideration 
and at times has failed even to inform the parties to the case of the issues to be considered 
upon review”). Though not required by regulation, the Attorney General may still “invite” 
the parties or amici to submit briefs on the matter. L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 494, 494 (A.G. 
2018).  
 79 Eight cases were certified by Attorney General Sessions. See Negusie, 27 I. & N. 
Dec. 481 (A.G. 2018); M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 476 (A.G. 2018); M-G-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 469 
(A.G. 2018); S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 462 (A.G. 2018); L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 
405 (A.G. 2018); A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 
(A.G. 2018); E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226 (A.G. 2018). The two most recent cases were 
certified by Acting Attorney General Whitaker. See Castillo-Perez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 495 (A.G. 
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cases selected for review under the Trump Administration in thematic 
groupings, rather than chronological order of certification. Generally, though 
with some overlap, the cases certified fall into three broad categories: decisions 
limiting the discretion and authority of IJs and the Board, decisions intended to 
streamline the immigration adjudication process and promote efficiency, as well 
as decisions generally restricting the eligibility requirements for asylum and 
withholding of removal applicants.  
A. Decisions Limiting the Authority of Immigration Judges and the 
Board of Immigration Appeals  
The first theme of decisions under the Trump Administration involves 
holdings that limit the discretion and authority of IJs and the Board. Certain 
judges, or even courts, have gained a perception that the judgments they deliver 
will be based on their own political ideologies, and this is certainly the 
perception held by the Trump Administration.80 In the absence of binding 
precedent or regulatory norms regarding a certain issue, the political ideologies 
of individual IJs indeed appear to have had a role in immigration law.81 For 
example, whether domestic violence victims fleeing their persecutors were 
eligible for asylum had been relatively unclear for decades.82 Without clear legal 
guidance, a particular IJ’s interpretation and use of discretion controlled whether 
he or she granted a domestic violence victim asylum—thus, some IJs granted 
                                                                                                                     
2018); L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 494 (A.G. 2018). However, the authority of an Acting 
Attorney General to refer to himself a case has been challenged by commentators as violating 
the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, as well as statutorily violating a law that 
governs the succession between Attorneys General and the Federal Vacancies Reform Act. 
Amicus Briefs: Matter of Negusie, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Dec. 3, 2018), http://www 
.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/amicus_brief/matter-negusie [https://perma.cc/ME 
6B-J6JQ]. Finally, Attorney General Barr certified two cases in his first few months in 
office, which were consolidated into one decision. See Thomas & Thompson, 27 I. & N. 
Dec. 556 (A.G. 2019).  
 80 See Political Scientist Weighs In on Trump’s Criticism of 9th Circuit Court of 
Appeals, NPR (Nov. 22, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/22/670313813/political-
scientist-weighs-in-on-trumps-criticism-of-9th-circuit-court-of-appeal [https://perma 
.cc/QGF4-WKXD]. Responding to a decision from the 9th Circuit, President Trump stated, 
“This was an Obama judge. And I’ll tell you what, it’s not going to happen like this 
anymore.” Id. But see Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 
91 CALIF. L. REV. 1457, 1515 (2003) (concluding that, although judicial preferences may 
play a small role, decision-making according to the law “is the most powerful determinant”).  
 81 Blaine Bookey, Gender-Based Asylum Post-Matter of A-R-C-G-: Evolving 
Standards and Fair Application of the Law, 22 SW. J. INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (2016) (noting the 
acceptance by some IJs over domestic violence-based asylum claims and the rejection by 
others).  
 82 Recent Adjudication: Asylum Law—Membership in a Particular Social Group—
Board of Immigration Appeals Holds that Guatemalan Woman Fleeing Domestic Violence 
Meets Threshold Asylum Requirement.—Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26. I. & N. Dec 388 (B.I.A. 
2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 2090, 2090 (2015) [hereinafter Recent Adjudication]. 
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domestic violence based asylum and others did not.83 Inconsistencies exist 
elsewhere in immigration law, and one method to ensure consistent application 
is by limiting the discretionary authority of IJs and the Board.84 
Previously, IJs and the Board had the discretion to administratively close 
cases, which was a useful tool to manage dockets.85 In certifying Matter of 
Castro-Tum, though, Attorney General Sessions sought to review the authority 
of IJs and the Board to administratively close cases.86 He concluded that IJs and 
the Board have no general authority to administratively close cases but only 
have authority in certain instances provided for expressly by the regulations or 
by a settlement.87 Therefore, this decision necessarily limits IJ and Board 
authority.88 Moreover, because the court was unsure if Castro-Tum received the 
                                                                                                                     
 83 See Bookey, supra note 81, at 2–3. Judge Couch, the IJ who first heard Matter of A-
B-, denied ten domestic violence based claims just in 2017—with some opinions later 
determined to be “clearly erroneous” upon review by the Board. Tal Kopan, Judge in Case 
Sessions Picked for Immigrant Domestic Violence Asylum Review Issued ‘Clearly 
Erroneous’ Decisions, Says Appellate Court, CNN (Apr. 28, 2018), https://www.cnn 
.com/2018/04/28/politics/jeff-sessions-immigration-courts-domestic-violence-asylum 
/index.html [https://perma.cc/4EH6-MG4Q]. However, other judges have taken a broader 
approach by applying established standards regarding gender-based violence in general to 
domestic violence claims. Bookey, supra note 81, at 2–3. 
 84 See M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 476, 476 (A.G. 2018); M-G-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 469, 469 
(A.G. 2018); E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226, 226 (A.G. 2018).  
 85 When an IJ or the Board administratively closes a case, “the proceedings are halted, 
the case is removed from the active docket, and the respondent has no future hearing dates 
scheduled.” AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL & ACLU, ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSURE POST-
CASTRO-TUM: PRACTICE ADVISORY 2 (Oct. 2019), https://www.americanimmigration 
council.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/administrative_closure_post -castro-
tum.pdf [https://perma.cc/HUF8-7WPM]. The proceedings are not re-calendared unless 
one party moves to continue. Id. Notably, “[a]dministrative closure does not terminate or 
dismiss the case and it ‘does not provide [a noncitizen] with any immigration status’; the 
individual remains ‘in’ removal proceedings.” Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
IJs or the Board previously could administratively close cases in a few different situations: 
for example, if a noncitizen has been granted deferred action, if a noncitizen is awaiting 
adjudication elsewhere, such as from the USCIS, or if a noncitizen is not considered 
competent. See W-Y-U-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 17, 18 (B.I.A. 2017) (citing Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. 
Dec. 688, 69192 (B.I.A. 2012)).  
 86 Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 27172 (A.G. 2018); Richard Gonzales, Sessions 
Moves to Curb Immigration Judges’ Authority, NPR (May 17, 2018), https://www.npr 
.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/05/17/612200263/sessions-moves-to-curb-immigration-
judges-authority [https://perma.cc/94AK-HX83].  
 87 Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 271, 278 (“[T]hese regulations limit administrative 
closure authority to specific categories of cases, but do not delegate the general authority to 
authorize administrative closure.”).  
 88 Id. at 271. Not only will IJs and the Board no longer be able to use administrative 
closure as a tool to manage their dockets, but past administratively closed cases may be 
required to be recalendared if either party requests. See id. at 272 (explaining the process of 
recalendaring an administratively closed case).  
2020] BUILDING LEGAL WALLS 327 
notices to appear, it initially closed the case for due process concerns.89 Thus, 
by denying IJs and the Board the discretion to administratively close cases, the 
decision also risks the due process rights of noncitizens during removal 
proceedings. Ultimately, in Romero v. Barr, the Fourth Circuit abrogated 
Attorney General Sessions’s decision by finding that regulations implementing 
the INA “unambiguously confer upon IJs and the [Board] the general authority 
to administratively close cases.”90 
Attorney General Sessions also reviewed the procedure used by IJs for 
granting a noncitizen’s motion for a continuance in Matter of L-A-B-R-.91 By 
regulation, IJs are permitted to grant motions for continuances for good cause 
shown by a noncitizen awaiting the outcome of other pending “collateral 
matter.”92 The regulations do not provide a clear definition of “good cause,” and 
this led the Board to create a balancing test to aid in the determination.93 
However, Attorney General Sessions used the opportunity to set forth a good 
cause standard limiting the discretion of IJs to grant continuances for, what he 
deemed, “any reason or no reason at all.”94 According to him, “the good-cause 
requirement is an important check on immigration judges’ authority that reflects 
the public interest in expeditious enforcement of the immigration laws, as well 
as the tendency of unjustified continuances to undermine the proper functioning 
of our immigration system.”95 This decision, too, limits IJs’ discretion and 
prevents them from controlling their dockets as they see fit. Moreover, it 
requires an IJ, who may have 10–15 motions for a continuance per day, “to write 
                                                                                                                     
 89 Matthew Archambeault, The Repercussions of How the Administration Has Handled 
Matter of Castro-Tum, THINK IMMIGR. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://thinkimmigration.org/ 
blog/2018/08/14/the-repercussions-of-how-the-administration-has-handled-matter-of 
-castro-tum/ [https://perma.cc/UHN2-3Y2A]. 
 90 Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282, 294 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b), 
1003.1(d)(1)(ii)).  
 91 L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405, 405 (A.G. 2018). A motion for continuance allows 
an IJ to “move an upcoming hearing from one scheduled date to another or to pause an 
ongoing hearing and move it to a future date.” AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, PRACTICE 
ADVISORY: MOTIONS FOR A CONTINUANCE 1 (Sept. 2018), https://www.american 
immigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/motions_for_a_continua
nce_practice_advisory.pdf [https://perma.cc/BF6N-Y3GD]. Generally, an IJ may 
authorize a continuance for good cause shown. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (1994). Additionally, an 
IJ may authorize “a reasonable adjournment either at his or her own instance” or for good 
cause shown. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.6 (2019). However, the regulations fail to define “good 
cause.” 
 92 See L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 405 (“For example, an alien may move for a 
continuance because he is the subject of a family- or employment-based visa petition that, if 
approved by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services . . . would enable him to 
apply for adjustment of status in the immigration court and become a lawful permanent 
resident.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (1994) (“The Immigration Judge may grant a motion for 
continuance for good cause shown.”).  
 93 See L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 405.  
 94 Id.  
 95 Id. at 406.  
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lengthy, highly detailed decisions for each of these while still trying to complete 
three or more full hearings a day.”96 
In Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B-, on the other hand, Attorney General 
Sessions reviewed IJ authority to terminate or dismiss removal proceedings.97 
He determined that, pursuant to Matter of Castro-Tum, IJs “have no inherent 
authority to terminate or dismiss removal proceedings.”98 Indeed, IJs can only 
terminate proceedings when expressly provided for by regulation or when 
charges of removability are not sustained.99 Attorney General Sessions made 
mention that “the authority to dismiss or terminate proceedings is not a free-
floating power an immigration judge may invoke whenever he or she believes 
that a case no longer merits space on the docket.”100 Instead, an IJ must continue 
with removal proceedings if the claims in the Notice to Appear can be sustained 
by the DHS.101 This decision, like Matter of Castro-Tum, limits IJ discretion to 
independently terminate proceedings.102 However, IJs can still terminate in 
other certain permitted contexts or when required by regulation.103 
Finally, in Matter of Thomas & Thompson, Attorney General Barr 
considered the extent of IJ discretion when a noncitizen’s criminal conviction is 
altered by state court orders.104 Attorney General Barr referred the case to 
consider specifically “whether, and under what circumstances, judicial 
alteration of a criminal conviction or sentence—whether labeled ‘vacatur,’ 
‘modification,’ ‘clarification,’ or some other term—should be taken into 
consideration in determining the immigration consequences of the 
                                                                                                                     
 96 Retired IJs and Former Members of the BIA Issue Statement in Response to Matter 
of L-A-B-R-, AM. IMMIGR. LAW. ASS’N (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.aila.org/infonet/ 
retired-ijs-former-bia-statement-matter-of-l-a-b-r [https://perma.cc/K3LN-YKXA].  
 97 S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 462, 462 (A.G. 2018).  
 98 Id. 
 99 Id.; see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1239.2(c), (f) (2004) (permitting government counsel or an 
officer to move for dismissal under certain circumstances or IJ to terminate the removal 
proceedings if the alien has an application for naturalization pending that is likely to be 
granted); see also S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 462 (permitting an IJ to dismiss 
“where the Department of Homeland Security fails to sustain the charges of removability 
against a respondent”).  
 100 S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 468. 
 101 Id. at 467–68. 
 102 See Attorney General Restricts Immigration Judges’ and BIA’s Power to Dismiss or 
Terminate Removal Proceedings, CATH. LEGAL IMMIGR. NETWORK (Sept. 27, 2018), 
https://cliniclegal.org/resources/attorney-general-restricts-immigration-judges-and-bias 
-power-dismiss-or-terminate-removal [https://perma.cc/KZ99-3Z7H] (“Matter of S-O-
G- & F-D-B- will make it harder for IJs to terminate proceedings unless DHS seeks dismissal 
under the regulations.”).  
 103 See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1216.4(a)(6) (1996) (providing for termination following the 
approval of conditional lawful permanent resident status); id. §§ 1235.3(b), 1235.6 (a)(iv) 
(2009) (providing for termination for noncitizens whose status has not been terminated in 
expedited removal proceedings).  
 104 Thomas & Thompson, 27 I. & N. Dec. 556, 556 (A.G. 2019).  
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conviction.”105 Under the INA, certain criminal convictions also result in 
immigration consequences, such as inadmissibility or deportation.106 However, 
in some instances a noncitizen may have a criminal conviction, through some 
form of post-conviction relief, vacated, modified, or clarified to avoid the 
conviction’s immigration consequences.107 An IJ could then take the 
conviction’s alteration into consideration and provide discretionary relief based 
on immigration hardships.108 In Matter of Thomas & Thompson, though, 
Attorney General Barr held that state court orders modifying, clarifying, or 
otherwise altering a conviction will only be given legal effect when the 
alteration is based on procedural or substantive defects in the underlying 
criminal proceedings.109 Therefore, conviction alterations will no longer have 
legal effect on immigration proceedings if the alteration has nothing to do with 
the merits of the underlying conviction, and it was intended, for example, for 
rehabilitation or to ease immigration hardships.110 Attorney General Barr’s 
decision, therefore, further restricts IJ discretion by limiting their ability to 
consider the effect of conviction alterations.  
B. Decisions Streamlining the Immigration Adjudication Process 
The second theme of decisions under the Trump Administration aim to 
streamline the immigration adjudication process for efficiency purposes.111 
Without a doubt, immigration courts, like many other court systems, suffer from 
a heavy backlog of cases; as of 2015, there were more than 700,000 active 
                                                                                                                     
 105 Id.  
 106 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2019); see also id. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (defining “aggravated 
felony” as including “crime of violence,” which has a “term of imprisonment [of] at least 
one year”); id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (indicating that noncitizens with aggravated felony 
convictions are automatically deportable and thus ineligible for many types of relief or 
protection from removal).  
 107 For example, defendant’s counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky did not inform her client 
that entering a guilty plea carried a risk of deportation or any immigration consequences for 
that matter. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010). After pleading guilty to charges 
that made the defendant deportable, the defendant brought an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim. Id. at 359–60. The Supreme Court held that counsel could be considered 
ineffective under the Sixth Amendment if he or she fails to inform criminal defendants of 
immigration consequences. Id. Upon remand, the defendant’s conviction was vacated, which 
gave him the opportunity to try his case. Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 322, 330–
31 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).  
 108 See Thomas & Thompson, 27 I. & N. Dec. 674, 674 (A.G. 2019) (applying the tests 
set forth in Matter of Cota-Vargas, Matter of Song, and Matter of Estrada that enabled 
immigration courts to alter the legal effect of criminal conviction alterations); see also 
Estrada, 26 I. & N. Dec. 749, 755–56 (B.I.A. 2016); Cota-Vargas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 849, 850–
52 (B.I.A. 2005); Song, 23 I. & N. Dec. 173, 174 (B.I.A. 2001). 
 109 Thomas & Thompson, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 674.  
 110 Id. 
 111 See M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 476, 476 (A.G. 2018); M-G-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 469, 469 
(A.G. 2018); E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226, 226 (A.G. 2018).  
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cases.112 Attorney General Sessions acknowledged this fact in a speech 
delivered before IJs on June 11, 2018.113 In this speech he remarked, “The fact 
is we have a backlog of about 700,000 immigration cases, and it’s still growing 
. . . . This is not acceptable. We cannot allow it to continue.”114 The focus of his 
speech urged IJs to adhere to the rule of law and to “use [their] best efforts and 
proper policies to enhance [their] effectiveness.”115 Attorney General Sessions 
seemed to take up the issue himself with the certification of Matter of E-F-H-L, 
Matter of M-G-G-, Matter of M-S-.116 
Attorney General Sessions first began working to streamline the process in 
Matter of E-F-H-L-, which involved an applicant’s entitlement to an evidentiary 
hearing.117 After certifying the case, Attorney General Sessions vacated the 
decision four years after the case had closed.118 During the initial removal 
proceedings in Matter of E-F-H-L-, the respondent conceded removability and 
sought relief from removal by applying for asylum and withholding of 
removal.119 Without an evidentiary hearing, the IJ determined that the 
respondent “failed as a matter of law to make a prima facie case” of eligibility 
                                                                                                                     
 112 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-438, IMMIGRATION COURTS: 
ACTIONS NEEDED TO REDUCE CASE BACKLOG AND ADDRESS LONG-STANDING 
MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 20 (2017) (“[T]he immigration courts’ 
overall annual caseload grew from approximately 517,000 cases in fiscal year 2006 to about 
747,000 cases in fiscal year 2015 . . . .”).  
 113 Jeff Sessions, U.S. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks to 
the Executive Office for Immigration Review Legal Training Program (June 11, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-executive 
-office-immigration-review-legal [https://perma.cc/84QJ-QK64].  
 114 Id.  
 115 Id.  
 116 See M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 476, 476 (A.G. 2018); M-G-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 469, 469 
(A.G. 2018); E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226, 226 (A.G. 2018). 
 117 See E-F-H-L-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 319, 324 (B.I.A. 2014) (holding that during “removal 
proceedings, an applicant for asylum or for withholding or deferral of removal is entitled to 
a hearing on the merits of the applications, including an opportunity to provide oral testimony 
and other evidence, without first having to establish prima facie eligibility for the requested 
relief”); see also E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226, 226 (A.G. 2018) (vacating the 2014 decision 
of the Board and holding that an asylum applicant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing).  
 118 E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226, 226 (A.G. 2018).  
 119 Id. The INA’s deportability provisions are broad; if a noncitizen falls into one of 
these categories, he or she would be considered removable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2008). The 
most common classifications include: “inadmissible aliens,” for obtaining admission through 
fraud or misrepresentation; aliens “present in violation of law,” applying to noncitizens who 
enter without inspection or remain after their status has expired; aliens who have “violated 
nonimmigrant status or condition[s] of entry,” covering noncitizens who have failed to 
comply with the terms of their status, such as obtaining unauthorized employment; or for 
certain “criminal offenses.” See id. If found removable, a noncitizen may apply for relief 
from removal, such as asylum or withholding of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2006). For 
further discussion on removal proceedings, see generally Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the 
Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2017).  
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and denied his application.120 After appealing to the Board, the Board remanded 
the respondent’s case finding that ordinarily, an applicant is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing when applying for asylum and withholding of removal.121 
Upon remand, though, the defendant withdrew his application with prejudice 
and applied through an alternative method.122 Despite this, Attorney General 
Sessions vacated the Board’s decision entitling an applicant to an evidentiary 
hearing.123 
The holding in Matter of E-F-F-L- brings forth a variety of practical 
consequences. First, this vacatur may mean that asylum and withholding of 
removal applications will be summarily dismissed if an applicant does not 
establish a prima facie case at the outset, rather than affording an applicant the 
opportunity to a full hearing.124 It also demonstrates that no seemingly 
established precedent is immune from Attorney General review.125 Still, the 
decision does streamline the removal process.126 In doing so, though, it may 
prematurely dismiss valid applications for asylum or withholding of removal.  
In another attempt to streamline immigration adjudications, Attorney 
General Sessions certified Matter of M-G-G- to himself on September 18, 
2018.127 In Matter of M-G-G-, he sought to address whether noncitizens 
detained and screened for expedited removal proceedings were entitled to a 
bond hearing.128 However, on October 12, 2018, Attorney General Sessions 
                                                                                                                     
 120 E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226, 226 (A.G. 2018). 
 121 Id.  
 122 Id. After the IJ administratively closed the applicant’s case, he sought status through 
a “Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130).” Id.  
 123 Id.  
 124 Paul W. Schmidt, What Does Sessions’ E-F-H-L- Order Mean?, LEXISNEXIS: LEGAL 
NEWSROOM (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/ 
b/immigration-law-blog/posts/what-does-sessions-39-e-f-h-l-order-mean [https://perma 
.cc/4TU8-BXR7] (stating, among other theories, that by doing away with “full hearings for 
asylum seekers,” Attorney General Sessions may want to “establish some type of ‘summary 
dismissal without hearing’ process for those who fail to establish a ‘prima facie case’ for 
asylum or withholding”).  
 125 Indeed, Attorney General Sessions offered no explanation for certifying this specific 
case four years after the case had closed. See id.  
 126 Andrew R. Arthur, Attorney General Moves to Streamline Immigration 
Adjudications, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Mar. 6, 2018), https://cis.org/Arthur/Attorney-
General-Moves-Streamline-Immigration-Adjudications [https://perma.cc/5NJ7-9TQM] 
(arguing that the decision will “streamline the adjudication of immigration applications, give 
immigration judges the authority to summarily dismiss deficient asylum applications, and 
cut down on the filing of frivolous applications to delay removal”).  
 127 M-G-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 469, 469 (A.G. 2018).  
 128 Id. The “expedited removal” proceeding allows an immigration officer to summarily 
order the removal of noncitizens “who are present in the U.S. without having been admitted 
or paroled by an immigration officer at a designated port-of-entry, who are encountered by 
an immigration officer within 100 air miles of the U.S. international land border, and who 
have not established to the satisfaction of an immigration officer that they have been 
physically present in the U.S. continuously for the fourteen-day (14-day) period immediately 
prior to the date of encounter.” Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 
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announced that he would no longer review the Board’s decision, because the 
respondent had been removed to his home country, Guatemala, since being 
certified.129 On the very same day, though, Attorney General Sessions certified 
Matter of M-S- to himself, to answer the exact question posed in Matter of M-
G-G-.130  
Upon taking office, Attorney General Barr issued a decision in Matter of M-
S- eliminating bond hearings for individuals detained for expedited removal 
proceedings, despite having established a credible fear of persecution.131 This 
decision overturned Matter of X-K-, in which the Board held that once a 
noncitizen is screened from expedited removal, for example by establishing a 
credible fear of persecution, and can proceed with an application for asylum or 
withholding of removal, he or she is entitled to a bond hearing.132 The decision 
has yet to fully take effect, though, because a class of asylum applicants 
challenged the decision in Padilla.133 The government has since appealed the 
Padilla decision to the Ninth Circuit.134 Though the Ninth Circuit has yet to rule 
on the case, under Attorney General Barr’s holding, Matter of M-S- threatened 
to mandatorily detain a noncitizen in asylum proceedings, which can last months 
or even years.135 While that decision, too, arguably attempted to streamline the 
adjudication process by eliminating individual bond hearings in this instance, it 
did so at the risk of a noncitizen’s indefinite detention.136  
                                                                                                                     
48,877, 48,877 (Aug. 11, 2004). If, however, an asylum officer “determines that an alien in 
expedited removal proceedings has a credible fear of persecution or torture” or an “alien 
requests a review of that determination by an immigration judge,” a noncitizen can avoid 
expedited removal and proceed with an application for asylum or withholding of removal. 8 
C.F.R. § 235.6 (2009).  
 129 M-G-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 475, 475 (A.G. 2018).  
 130 M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 476, 476 (A.G. 2018).  
 131 M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509, 509 (A.G. 2019).  
 132 See X-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 731, 731 (B.I.A. 2005). 
 133 See Padilla v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1170, 1224 (W.D. 
Wash. 2019), modified sub nom. Padilla v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 387 
F. Supp. 3d 1219 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (order modifying a preliminary injunction but 
affirming that the government must provide eligible individuals with bond hearings with 
certain procedural protections within seven days or release these individuals from detention).  
 134 See Padilla v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, No. 19-35565 (9th Cir. July 22, 
2019) (order upholding preliminary injunction in part and denying in part).  
 135 See Fact Sheet: U.S. Asylum Process, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (Jan. 10, 2019), https:// 
immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-u-s-asylum-process/ [https://perma.cc/M36A-
QV8H] (noting that the “length of the asylum process varies, but it typically takes between 
6 months and several years,” and in July 2018, “the average wait time for an immigration 
hearing was 721 days”).  
 136 But see Brief for Former INS & DHS General Counsels as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 2, Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019) (No. 16-1363) (seeking an answer 
from the Court over whether a criminal alien is subject to mandatory detention under 8 
U.S.C. § 1226(c), if he was not taken into custody by DHS immediately). Bond proceedings 
do not take long, maybe less than ten minutes, and impose no great administrative burden on 
IJs. Id. at 11.  
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C. Decisions Restricting Eligibility Requirements for Applicants  
Finally, the third theme of decisions under the Trump Administration entail 
restricting the eligibility of applicants for asylum and withholding of 
removal.137 This theme seems to naturally correspond to the first two: in order 
to streamline the immigration adjudication process and indirectly limit the 
authority of IJs and the Board, the number of applicants must decrease. By 
constraining the eligibility criteria for asylum and withholding of removal, the 
number of applicants will likely decrease. While an Attorney General cannot 
restrict the statutory criteria, he can remind the IJs and the Board of their 
“responsibility . . . to ensure that our immigration system operates in a manner 
that is consistent with the laws enacted by Congress.”138 
First, in Matter of A-B- Attorney General Sessions reviewed the Board’s 
decision granting asylum to a domestic violence victim under a “particular 
social group” (PSG) based claim.139 The Board’s decision was supported by 
Matter of A-R-C-G-,140 which was the first case to hold that domestic violence 
victims can constitute a cognizable “particular social group” following decades-
long uncertainty over the status of domestic violence victims for asylum 
purposes.141 However, in Matter of A-B-, the decision was overruled.142 
Attorney General Sessions determined that “being a victim of private criminal 
activity [does not] constitute[] a cognizable ‘particular social group’ for 
purposes of an application for asylum or withholding of removal.”143 Under this 
ruling, immigration courts can only recognize domestic violence-based asylum 
                                                                                                                     
 137 See generally Castillo-Perez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 495 (A.G. 2018); L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. 
Dec. 494 (A.G. 2018); Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 481 (A.G. 2018); A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 
(A.G. 2018). 
 138 Sessions, supra note 113.  
 139 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 316. An applicant for asylum must demonstrate that she has 
either suffered past persecution or that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution on 
account of protected ground—that is, race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or 
membership in a particular social group. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2014). The fifth ground, 
“membership in a particular social group,” is notoriously indefinite. See, e.g., Fatin v. INS, 
12 F.3d 1233, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Read in its broadest literal sense, the phrase is almost 
completely open-ended.”). As a means to limit the scope of the refugee definition, the Board 
“interpret[ed] the phrase ‘persecution on account of membership in a particular social group’ 
to mean persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of 
persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic” and this “characteristic 
might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or . . . a shared past experience 
such as military leadership or land ownership.” Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 
1985), overruled on other grounds by Mogharrabi, I. & N. Dec. 439, 439 (B.I.A. 1987). 
Whether victims of domestic violence qualify for asylum had been an ongoing and, at times, 
contentious question within asylum law. Recent Adjudication, supra note 82, at 2090. 
 140 A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 141 Recent Adjudication, supra note 82, at 2093. 
 142 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 316.  
 143 Id. at 317.  
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claims in the most narrow circumstances.144 Moreover, by labeling domestic 
violence broadly as “private criminal conduct,” the decision calls into question 
other well established PSGs also comprised of victims of private criminal 
conduct.145 
Indeed, then-Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker questioned the 
validity of another PSG-based asylum claim when he certified Matter of  
L-E-A-.146 The Acting Attorney General certified the case to address whether a 
noncitizen can establish asylum eligibility based on membership in a “particular 
social group” on account of “membership in a family unit.”147 The Board first 
recognized the family unit as a cognizable PSG in 2017.148 On July 29, 2019, 
Attorney General Barr ultimately issued a decision in Matter of L-E-A-, holding 
that a family unit will now only be considered a PSG if “it has been shown to 
be socially distinct in the eyes of its society.”149 This added restriction comes at 
a time when many commentators already view the eligibility requirements for 
asylum as a family unit as too restrictive.150 
In certifying Matter of Negusie, Attorney General Sessions sought to answer 
“[w]hether coercion and duress are relevant to the application of the [INA’s] 
persecutor bar” for a noncitizen applying for asylum or withholding of 
removal.151 The Supreme Court addressed the issue in Negusie v. Holder, but 
ultimately remanded for the Board to determine whether the bar to asylum for 
applicants that have themselves persecuted others could claim an exception for 
duress.152 The Board issued its opinion on remand in 2018, five months prior to 
Attorney General Sessions’ certification, in which it held that an asylum 
applicant, who was otherwise barred from eligibility, could claim duress as a 
defense, albeit in a limited nature.153 The Attorney General has not yet issued a 
                                                                                                                     
 144 See id. at 316 (requiring domestic violence-based asylum claims to be accompanied 
by a showing that the applicants home country is unwilling or unable to control the private 
criminal conduct).  
 145 See id. These groups include, among others, those comprised of family membership, 
members of the LGBTQ community, or former child soldiers—each subject to persecution 
at the hands of private actors. L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 40 (B.I.A. 2017); Lukwago v. 
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 157 (3d Cir. 2003); Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 819 
(B.I.A. 1990). 
 146 L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 494, 494 (A.G. 2018).  
 147 Id. 
 148 L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 42, 47 (concluding that “an immediate family may 
constitute a particular social group,” but ultimately finding that the applicant failed to 
establish that his membership in his family unit was at least one central reason for his fear 
of future persecution).  
 149 L-E-A, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581, 582 (A.G. 2019).  
 150 See, e.g., Jeffery S. Chase, Matter of L-E-A-: The BIA’s Missed Opportunity, 
OPINIONS/ANALYSIS IMMIGR. L. (June 22, 2017), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/ 
2017/6/11/matter-of-l-e-a-the-bias-missed-opportunity?rq=LEA [https://perma.cc/TJ3V-
3SBX].  
 151 Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 481, 481 (A.G. 2018).  
 152 Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 514 (2009).  
 153 Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 347, 347 (B.I.A. 2018).  
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decision, but it is likely that any decision will follow the trend of restricting 
eligibility. Therefore, the Attorney General may decide to eliminate, or at least 
narrow, the exception.  
Finally, Acting Attorney General Whitaker referred to himself Matter of 
Castillo-Perez, seeking to determine the correct “legal standard for determining 
when an individual lacks ‘good moral character’” regarding an application for 
cancellation of removal.154 Particularly, he sought to consider the effect of 
“multiple convictions for driving while intoxicated or driving under the 
influence” on good moral character.155 Attorney General Barr ultimately 
decided the case, holding that “evidence of two or more convictions for driving 
under the influence during the relevant period establishes a rebuttable 
presumption that the [noncitizen] lacked good moral character during that 
time.”156 Moreover, because noncitizens must possess good moral character for 
ten years before being eligible for cancellation of removal, two or more 
convictions for driving under the influence also establishes that the noncitizen 
is not eligible for cancellation of removal.157 The decision nevertheless further 
restricts a noncitizen’s immigration eligibility.  
D. Criticisms of the Trump Administration’s Use of the Referral 
Authority  
Many of the criticisms leveled at prior uses of the referral authority by 
Attorneys General of past administrations mirror the criticisms of the use of the 
referral authority under the Trump Administration.158 However, because the 
Trump Administration has used the referral authority substantially more than 
other administrations, this criticism is amplified.159 The criticism generally 
                                                                                                                     
 154 Castillo-Perez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 495, 495 (A.G. 2018). “Cancellation of removal” is a 
form of relief from removal that, depending on the class of noncitizen, generally requires the 
noncitizen to have been continuously present in the U.S. for ten years, be a person of good 
moral character, have no convictions that would make the noncitizen inadmissible, and 
establish “that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1229(b) (2008).  
 155 Castillo-Perez, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 495.  
 156 Castillo-Perez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 664, 664 (A.G. 2019).  
 157 Id.  
 158 See generally Trice, supra note 8 (calling to attention the controversial nature of the 
Attorney General’s referral authority, specifically regarding the lack of procedural 
safeguards to ensure due process, transparency, and legitimacy, in 2010, under the Obama 
Administration’s tenure).  
 159 For example, “[i]n his first year, Sessions referred eight cases to himself.” Sarah 
Pierce, Sessions: The Trump Administration’s Once-Indispensable Man on Immigration, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ 
sessions-trump-administrations-once-indispensable-man-immigration [https://perma 
.cc/95G8-EYEW]. Acting Attorney General Whitaker has referred two cases to himself, 
bringing the total number under the Trump Administration to ten. See Castillo-Perez, 27 I. 
& N. Dec. 495, 495 (A.G. 2018); L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 494, 494 (A.G. 2018). Again, the 
Obama Administration only used the referral authority four times in eight years, and the 
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involves the lack of transparency under Attorney General decision-making and 
the lack of due process throughout the process.160 
First, as a tenet of our legal system, there is a strong expectation for claims 
to be adjudicated by an impartial and neutral adjudicator.161 Thus, when a 
politically appointed Attorney General serves as an adjudicator, questions of 
impartiality arise.162 This concern is heightened when an Attorney General has, 
for example, been known for his “hard-line immigration stance” while serving 
as a member of Congress.163 In fact, issues of impartiality arose in a recent 
decision by Attorney General Sessions, which prompted him to include a 
disclaimer of his impartiality in the opinion.164 The disclaimer was in response 
to many commentators alleging that Attorney General Sessions had 
“prejudge[d]” the case and generally “lack[ed] impartiality.”165 He claimed, 
however, that despite his previous comments regarding immigration policy, he 
had no “personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings” and never 
expressed any comments regarding the specific case before him.166 Still, his 
consistent, restrictive stance towards immigration167 and the curb on 
immigration that many of his decisions have set forth make his simple 
disclaimer asserting impartiality inadequate.  
Second, the Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment applies to all individuals present in the United States, “whether 
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”168 However, 
Attorney General Sessions disregarded this guarantee of due process through 
the certification process and by using that process to set precedent that threatens 
                                                                                                                     
Bush Administration used the referral authority nine times in eight years. Pierce, supra note 
159.  
 160 Hausman, supra note 15 (“And although the immigration courts have long been 
plagued by due process problems—including the lack of any right to an appointed lawyer, 
even for kids—those courts have at least held out the promise of neutrality: a neutral 
immigration judge hears the case, and the losing party may appeal to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals. But Jeff Sessions is aggressively working to make these courts 
instruments of the Trump administration’s immigration agenda.”).  
 161 Taylor, supra note 67, at 19 (describing the expectation for “impartial” adjudication 
in the American legal system).  
 162 See id.  
 163 Seung Min Kim & Josh Gerstein, What Jeff Sessions Thinks About Immigration, 
Police and Terrorism, POLITICO (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/ 
01/jeff-sessions-views-attorney-general-233383 [https://perma.cc/JRE6-GGZC] (noting 
that “Sessions has also long advocated for curbs to future legal immigration”).  
 164 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 324–25 (A.G. 2018).  
 165 Id.  
 166 Id. at 325 (citing Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 741 (9th Cir. 1995)).  
 167 For example, Attorney General Sessions was one of the “fiercest opponents” of a 
bipartisan push for comprehensive immigration reform in 2013. Kim & Gerstein, supra note 
163.  
 168 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (finding that a noncitizen held for 
longer than ninety days following a final order of removal violated the due process rights of 
the noncitizen, guaranteed to citizens and noncitizens alike).  
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the future due process rights of noncitizens.169 In Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 
for example, Attorney General Sessions did not provide advance notice to the 
parties that he was reviewing the case or allow for briefing by the parties.170 The 
Supreme Court has recognized meaningful notice and opportunity to be heard 
as an “elementary and fundamental requirement” of due process,171 which 
applies in the immigration context as well.172 Additionally, while many of 
Attorney General Sessions’ decisions sought to improve the efficiency of the 
immigration process, it was often at the expense of noncitizens’ due process 
rights. For example, in Matter of E-F-H-L-, Attorney General Sessions 
eliminated required hearings for applicants that provided them an opportunity 
to testify and present evidence of their eligibility before an IJ.173 Due process, 
though, guarantees noncitizens the opportunity to both present evidence and 
testify on their own behalf before an IJ.174 Therefore, while the immigration 
courts may move faster under Attorney General Sessions’ decisions, they most 
definitely are not more fair.  
Thus, though critics have long condemned the referral authority for its lack 
of procedural safeguards and transparency,175 its use under the Trump 
Administration amplifies critics’ concerns.176 The Trump Administration’s use 
of the referral authority differs from prior administrations, which used it to 
resolve questions regarding larger legal issues, to establish new standards for 
                                                                                                                     
 169 See L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 494, 494 (A.G. 2018); Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 481, 
481 (A.G. 2018); M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 476, 476 (A.G. 2018); A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 
317 (A.G. 2018); Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 281 (A.G. 2018); E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. 
Dec. 226, 226 (A.G. 2018).  
 170 S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 462, 462 (2018) (“I granted review of these two 
cases to provide guidance on the appropriate standard by which immigration judges and the 
Board should evaluate such motions. Because the relevant regulation is clear, I concluded 
that additional briefing was unnecessary.”). Generally, “there is no entitlement to briefing 
when a matter is certified for Attorney General review.” Mary Holper, The New Moral 
Turpitude Test: Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1241, 1253 (2011) (citation 
omitted).  
 171 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1950).  
 172 Chike v. INS, 948 F.2d 961, 962 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a noncitizen’s due 
process rights were violated when the Board failed to provide the noncitizen the briefing 
schedule with sufficient time to prepare a brief). But see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(2), (e)(4) 
(2008) (permitting the Board authority, in certain instances, for summary dismissal of any 
appeal or portion of appeal or affirmance without providing an opinion).  
 173 See E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 226.  
 174 Oshodi v. Holder, 729 F.3d 883, 889–93 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (finding that an IJ 
who denied a noncitizen relief based only on an adverse credibility finding and denying the 
noncitizen a chance to testify violated the noncitizen’s Fifth Amendment due process right 
to a full and fair hearing). 
 175 See generally Trice, supra note 8 (describing the lack of due process and 
transparency inherent in the use of the referral authority and calling for the creation of 
procedural safeguards by regulation). 
 176 See Hausman, supra note 15 (describing some issues with the use of the referral 
authority under Attorney General Sessions). 
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future cases, or directly handle delicate issues of foreign policy.177 Instead, in 
the span of about three years, Attorneys General have used the referral authority 
to upset years of well-established precedent in a multitude of ways, and with 
little transparency or regard for the due process rights of noncitizens.178 As such, 
this area of immigration law needs reform.  
IV. STATUTORY AMENDMENT LIMITING ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ADJUDICATORY POWER 
Thus far this Note has provided a background and overview of the referral 
authority, considered its use throughout previous administrations, and surveyed 
its use under the Trump Administration. A comparison between the referral 
authority’s use in previous administrations and its use under the Trump 
Administration demonstrates many of the concerns long recognized by 
commentators. Below, I suggest curing the due process and transparency 
concerns by statutorily amending the INA. I also explain why this is the most 
practical option among the foregoing suggestions for reforming Attorney 
General use of the referral authority.  
A. Eliminating the Referral Authority by a Statutory Amendment to the 
INA  
The INA, by its terms, does not allow for the due process and transparency 
necessary in an adjudicatory context, whether for citizens or noncitizens. 
Therefore, this section suggests statutorily amending the INA to mandate 
Attorney General rulemaking exclusively through informal notice-and-
comment rulemaking. This suggestion is in contrast to the current method, 
which allows an Attorney General to either review under the referral authority 
or exercise notice-and-comment rulemaking.179 Either form, rulemaking by 
                                                                                                                     
 177 See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 861 (describing the practices of past attorneys 
general in regard to foreign policy).  
 178 See generally Castillo-Perez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 495 (A.G. 2018); L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. 
Dec. 494 (A.G. 2018); Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 481 (A.G. 2018); M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 476 
(A.G. 2018); M-G-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 469 (A.G. 2018); S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 
462 (A.G. 2018); L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018); A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 
(A.G. 2018); Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018); E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226 
(A.G. 2018). 
 179 See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g) (2009) (describing Attorney General review authority and 
regulatory reform powers, including notice and comment); Trice, supra note 8, at 1795 (“Of 
course, it is well settled that agencies have broad discretion to choose between rulemaking 
and adjudication as a means of establishing agency policy and articulating binding legal 
rules.”). On the other hand, some agencies do not have broad discretion to choose the type 
of rulemaking for a particular issue, but rather are limited by a statutory mandate directing 
the agency to use a particular type of rulemaking. See Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 
1088–89 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that the EPA was statutorily mandated to determine 
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adjudication (by use of the referral authority) or informal rulemaking through 
notice-and-comment procedure, allows an Attorney General to set policy or 
address ambiguities within the INA.180 When Attorneys General have used 
notice-and-comment rulemaking in immigration law, they have typically used 
it for issues that, in their opinion, warrant cautious consideration and deserve 
the participation of all parties interested.181 These issues often relate to decisions 
that would significantly impact well-established precedent or involve a 
particularly sensitive topic.182  
Generally, under notice-and-comment rulemaking, a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking must be published by the agency in the Federal Register, which 
allows the public the opportunity to be a part of the process and provide 
comments.183 Following the comment period, the agency is required to consider 
the public’s comments and then publish the final version of the rule within thirty 
days before the rule takes effect.184 As a practical benefit, the process builds a 
record and allows an Attorney General to make a more informed decision, which 
is beneficial for judicial review.185 Moreover, many consider the notice-and-
comment process to be more transparent than agency adjudication.186 
Adjudications necessarily involve less communication with the public and 
“share less information overall.”187 Indeed, “any process that is seen as a means 
                                                                                                                     
certain jurisdictional issues under the Clean Air Act through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, rather than adjudicating on a case-by-case basis).  
 180 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–54 (2012) (providing the 
procedure for rulemaking). Aside from rulemaking and adjudication, there are a variety of 
other informal means available—for example, guidance, letters, advisory opinions, 
negotiations, or statements. See generally Andrew P. Morriss et al., Choosing How to 
Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179 (2005) (surveying the means by which an agency 
can create substantive regulations).  
 181 See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 911 (noting that notice-and-comment 
rulemaking is usually thoroughly conducted in order to create a record for judicial review).  
 182 Id. (“Most importantly, the government has a strong interest in maintaining its current 
procedures for referral and review.”). For example, when deciding the asylum eligibility of 
domestic violence victims, the decision in Matter of R-A- was vacated by Attorney General 
Janet Reno. R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 906 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated (A.G. 2001). Instead, she 
deemed the complex and sensitive issue of gender-based claims appropriate for notice-and-
comment rulemaking. See Immigration and Naturalization Service: Asylum and 
Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,58898 (Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. 
pt. 208).  
 183 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012).  
 184 5 U.S.C. § 553(d); Trice, supra note 8, at 1795 (noting that notice-and-comment 
rulemaking allows for, and is enriched by, “experts, advocates, and affected individuals 
[making] their views and arguments known”).  
 185 Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 911. 
 186 See Jill E. Family, Administrative Law through the Lens of Immigration Law, 64 
ADMIN. L. REV. 565, 579 (2012) (stating the risk of reliance on “case-by-case adjudication[]” 
as a form of rulemaking because “[a]gency decisionmaking might become less transparent”).  
 187 Id.  
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of evading more transparent and participatory methods clearly presents concerns 
about the legitimacy and acceptability of [his decisions].”188 
This is not to say that formal notice-and-comment rulemaking is without its 
own shortcomings. Admittedly, rulemaking by adjudication is more efficient.189 
The notice-and-comment process requires far more time and resources than a 
single, independent adjudication by an Attorney General, which allows an 
Attorney General to decide upon more issues more quickly.190 As described 
above, the process outlined by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
involves soliciting public comments, reviewing those comments, and setting 
aside a certain amount of time to consider those comments, which leaves many 
agencies reluctant to turn to “full-scale notice-and-comment rulemaking.”191 
Furthermore, notice-and-comment rulemaking does not guarantee neutrality.192 
In fact, there is no requirement that an Attorney General genuinely consider 
comments—the APA only requires an Attorney General to adhere to the 
process.193 However, even the minimal requirement of process under notice-
and-comment rulemaking offers more of a safeguard for due process and 
transparency than adjudication by an Attorney General using the referral 
authority, which requires no process.194 
In the context of immigration law, even marginal improvements to due 
process and transparency are warranted given the adjudicatory nature of asylum 
and withholding proceedings. As a nation, the expectation that adjudications 
                                                                                                                     
 188 Trice, supra note 8, at 1796.  
 189 See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 898 (describing the flexibility of the 
administrative process); Trice, supra note 8, at 1770 (“With retroactive effect and without 
cumbersome notice-and-comment process required for rulemaking, Attorney General review 
can be a particularly efficient means of reversing course and implementing a new 
administration’s policies.”). But cf. id. at 1770 (“However, it is this very efficiency—the 
Attorney General’s ability to swiftly and unilaterally reverse precedent and impose new legal 
standards—that makes the certification power a potentially dangerous tool and counsels in 
favor of strong procedural safeguards.”).  
 190 See Trice, supra note 8, at 1770 (arguing that Attorney General review under use of 
the referral authority is more flexible and efficient than the process of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking). 
 191 Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 911 (citing E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing 
Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992)).  
 192 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (requiring only that procedure be followed and the 
standards of review for the procedure, not that a substantive decision be reached); Gonzales 
& Glen, supra note 6, at 911–12 (arguing that the “due process and optics-based concerns” 
regarding an Attorney General’s use of referral authority would not meaningfully be cured 
by instead using notice-and-comment rulemaking).  
 193 See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 911 (describing how the notice-and-comment 
process is typically used only when “the proposed rule has ‘jelled’ into something fairly close 
to its final form”).  
 194 See Trice, supra note 8, at 1797 (noting the lack of procedural guidelines for the use 
of the referral authority and suggesting that the Attorney General “promulgate binding 
regulations that lay out in detail the procedures that must be followed when a case is certified 
for review”).  
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will be fair and impartial is deep-seated and constitutionally guaranteed.195 
Therefore, statutorily amending the INA to no longer allow an Attorney General 
to adjudicate individual immigration cases through use of the referral authority 
is necessary to ensure that due process and transparency is a part of the 
rulemaking process.  
1. Possible Approaches for Amending the INA 
Statutorily amending the INA is no small feat, but it has been done before. 
For example, in 1996, Congress amended the INA under the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and, among other changes, 
broadened the definition of “refugee” to include individuals who must endure 
an abortion and sterilization after violating their country’s one-child policy.196 
This pro-immigrant area of the amendment offered Chinese nationals fleeing 
coercive family planning measures in China access to asylum.197 Still, Congress 
approved the amendment as part of an omnibus appropriations bill following 
bipartisan negotiations and alongside other more restrictive immigration 
measures, such as increased border patrol and increased penalties for illegal 
immigration.198 This history demonstrates that amending the INA in the way 
this Note suggests will not be simple, and, to an extent, will require the 
cooperation of both parties as well as cooperation across political branches.  
Though not simple, an amendment to the INA could be successful even 
under the Trump Administration. There are at least two methods through which 
an amendment to the INA could be enacted into law. First, if President Trump 
wins a second term in 2020, and if there is at least a two-thirds majority of 
                                                                                                                     
 195 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (holding that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner); Jeffrey S. Chase, The Need for an 
Independent Immigration Court, OPINIONS/ANALYSIS IMMIGR. L. (Aug. 17, 2017), https:// 
www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2017/8/17/the-need-for-an-independent-immigration-court 
[https://perma.cc/FV7W-8FZT] (“It is a cornerstone of our justice system that judges not 
only be impartial, but that they also avoid the appearance of impartiality.”).  
 196 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009–689 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42) (2006)). In addition to expanding the definition of “refugee,” the Act also 
amended other aspects of the INA such as expanding certain definitions relating to criminal 
terms, altering procedural aspects, and allowing for increased security along the border with 
Mexico. Id. § 60105.  
 197 See id. § 601. 
 198 Id. § 60105. Notably, the bill passed through the House of Representatives and 
Senate shortly after a Republican majority took control following the 1994 midterm elections 
and President Bill Clinton signed into law the “Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996” on September 30, 1996. See Adam Clymer, The 1994 Elections: 
Congress the Overview; G.O.P. Celebrates Its Sweep to Power; Clinton Vows to Find 
Common Ground, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/10/ 
us/1994-elections-congress-overview-gop-celebrates-its-sweep-power-clinton-vows.html 
[https://perma.cc/HP9Z-HPMU].  
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Congress that would approve of the amendment, it could still pass.199 If a bill 
including the amendment passed in both houses, a two-thirds vote from 
members in both the House and Senate would also override a presidential 
veto.200 On the other hand, an amendment might follow the method Congress 
used in 1996 to pass the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act (IIRIRA): bipartisanship and compromise.201 Both sides of the political 
spectrum recognize the need for immigration law reform.202 Indeed, President 
Trump spoke of the need for bipartisan efforts in this area of the law in his State 
of the Union address on February 5, 2019.203 As with the IIRIRA in 1996, 
bipartisan efforts would be necessary to pass any type of immigration reform in 
the current divided Congress.204 For most bipartisan efforts, including IIRIRA, 
there would likely need to be other compromises in order to secure a statutory 
amendment terminating the use of Attorney General referral authority.205 
Though specific compromises will depend on what is important to each side and 
what is actually put on the negotiating table.  
                                                                                                                     
 199 At the time of this writing, the House is controlled by a Democratic majority 
following the 2018 midterm elections. Jonathan Martin & Alexander Burns, Democrats 
Capture Control of House; G.O.P. Holds Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/us/politics/midterm-elections-results.html [https://perma.cc 
/K8G4-43LN].  
 200 See ELIZABETH RYBICKI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22654, VETO OVERRIDE 
PROCEDURE IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE 1 (2015) (“A vetoed bill can become law if two-
thirds of the Members voting in each chamber agree, by recorded vote, a quorum being 
present, to repass the bill and thereby override the veto of the President.”).  
 201 See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009–689 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42) (2006)). 
 202 See Felicia Sonmez et al., Trump Uses State of the Union to Defiantly Defend His 
Immigration Agenda, Announce Date of Next Summit with North Korea’s Kim, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/trumps-2019-state-of-the-
union-address/2019/02/05/d2dd57f4-28a4-11e9-b2fc-721718903bfc_story.html?nore 
direct=on&utm_term=.5835c414fa73 [https://perma.cc/9PJP-94AB].  
 203 Admittedly, President Trump’s focus on immigration reform is largely his perceived 
need for funding to build a border wall. Id. (“President Trump called for more bipartisan 
cooperation in his State of the Union address Tuesday night as he stood before a Congress 
bitterly divided over his demand for border-wall funding that resulted in a 35-day partial 
government shutdown.”).  
 204 Robert Bach, The Progress of Immigration Reform, 21 DEF. ALIEN 7, 16 (1998) 
(“The implications for many communities in the United States, and especially for their 
countries of origin, led to a legislative correction last fall that drew widespread bipartisan 
support.”).  
 205 Alongside the provisions that opened asylum to Chinese nationals were provisions 
“cracking down” on illegal immigration. See Donald Kerwin, From IIRIRA to Trump: 
Connecting the Dots to the Current US Immigration Policy Crisis, 6 J. MIGRATION & HUM. 
SECURITY 192, 192 (2018) (noting that President Clinton referred to IIRIRA as “cracking 
down” on illegal immigration).  
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2. The Implications of Amending the INA 
Though there will be a variety of benefits from the proposed statutory 
amendment—specifically, preserved due process rights and increased 
transparency—there will also inevitability be certain drawbacks. First, by doing 
away with Attorney General referral authority, this will not just limit an 
Attorney General’s potential abuse of the authority, but also a future Attorney 
General’s ability to swiftly correct any past abuses.206 For instance, Attorney 
General Mukasey, two weeks before leaving office, restricted a noncitizen’s 
ability to allege ineffective assistance of counsel during removal proceedings.207 
However, shortly after taking office the same year, Attorney General Holder 
used the referral authority to vacate Attorney General Mukasey’s decision.208 
Though the referral authority is a quick means to reverse decisions not in line 
with an incoming administration, its overall efficiency is not that clear from this 
example; if Attorney General Mukasey had been required to set policy through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, he would not have been able to issue an 
arguably cursory decision just two weeks prior to leaving office.209 It follows, 
then, that Attorney General Holder would not have needed to use the referral 
authority to vacate Attorney General Mukasey’s decision. Instead, Attorney 
General Mukasey could have used notice-and-comment rulemaking from the 
start, soliciting and considering public opinion, and Attorney General Holder 
could have followed the same approach after taking office.  
As what might be considered another drawback, an Attorney General no 
longer would be able to use the referral authority to issue expedient policy over 
issues of national security. However, it is important to consider at what point in 
the process an Attorney General uses the referral authority—that is, when 
decisions are before the Board after a noncitizen or the government appeals an 
IJ decision.210 It is also important to consider that an Attorney General rarely 
uses the referral authority as a means to issue national security policy.211 
Instead, national security issues are often addressed before the appellate stage 
                                                                                                                     
 206 See Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2 (A.G. 2009). Not only did Attorney General 
Holder vacate the decision of previous Attorney General Mukasey, but he reconsidered the 
case through notice-and-comment rulemaking after determining that the legal framework at 
issue would benefit from public consideration. Id.  
 207 See Compean et al., 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 710 (A.G. 2009).  
 208 See id. at 712. 
 209 At least one scholar has referred to this type of hasty decision as “Midnight Agency 
Adjudication,” a practice of an Attorney General “who refers a controversial issue to himself 
and renders a decision upending agency precedent on his way out the door.” Taylor, supra 
note 67, at 20.  
 210 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (2018) (delineating who may refer cases before the 
Board to the Attorney General).  
 211 As former Attorney General Gonzales noted, most cases were referred to or by an 
Attorney General to resolve questions regarding larger legal issues, to establish new 
standards for future cases, or directly handle delicate issues of foreign policy. Gonzales & 
Glen, supra note 6, at 861.  
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and alongside other agencies and sometimes with direct input from the executive 
branch.212 For example, President Trump, the DHS, and the DOJ all recently 
collaborated to set national policy security.213 President Trump set forth specific 
policies, including prioritizing noncitizens for removal, but specifically those 
who “pose a risk to public safety or national security.”214 The U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (USCIS), an agency within DHS that is the first to 
encounter noncitizens crossing the border, then sent a Policy Memorandum to 
implement the President’s directive.215 This example demonstrates that the 
setting of national security policy is generally more collaborative and occurs 
before a noncitizen reaches the point in removal proceedings that an Attorney 
General could intervene through the use of referral authority. Moreover, aside 
from the referral authority, the Attorney General can still set policy through 
informal means of rulemaking—including, guidance, policy memorandums, or 
statements.216 
Therefore, even though there are certain drawbacks to eliminating the 
referral authority, the drawbacks are minimal and not outweighed by the risks 
of allowing an Attorney General to continue setting policy in this manner. Under 
Attorney General referral authority, serious due process concerns arise, which 
threatens transparency within the adjudication process. Because there are 
alternative means available for an Attorney General to set immigration policy—
specifically, notice-and-comment rulemaking—an Attorney General should be 
limited to this form of rulemaking to ensure fairness throughout the immigration 
adjudication process.  
B. Issues with Other Foregoing Suggestions for Reforming the Referral 
Authority  
Above, I provided an argument for prohibiting an Attorney General from 
using the referral authority. Indeed, Congress should statutorily amend the INA 
to limit the Attorney General to notice-and-comment rulemaking. This 
approach, of course, is not the only possible option. Below, I consider other 
suggested approaches to reforming the Attorneys General use of the referral 
                                                                                                                     
 212 See, e.g., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., PM-602-0050.1, UPDATED GUIDANCE 
FOR THE REFERRAL OF CASES AND ISSUANCES OF NOTICES TO APPEAR (NTAS) IN CASES 
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 214 Id. § 5.  
 215 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 212. 
 216 While these methods may also carry the potential for hasty decisions that do not 
involve public opinion, they benefit by affecting an entire class rather than individuals on a 
case-by-case basis that presents the due process and transparency concerns discussed. See 
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authority and explain why relegating an Attorney General to notice-and-
comment rulemaking is the preferred solution.  
First, the Supreme Court serves as an important check on immigration law 
and thus, a check on any Attorney General referral authority decisions. If, for 
example, an adverse decision from an immigration judge is appealed to the 
Board,217 a Board decision deemed a final agency action can be appealed to a 
court of appeals, and following a grant for a petition of certiorari, Supreme Court 
review is possible.218 The Supreme Court can review any Board or Attorney 
General decision; all noncitizens have a right to judicial review in some form 
following an order of removal, based on the weight of the interests at stake.219 
While the Court has not taken up the issue of Attorney General referral authority 
itself, it has considered decisions promulgated under the referral authority and 
Attorney General discretion under other provisions.220 Courts, however, have 
“long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental 
sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely 
immune from judicial control.”221 With this strong deference to the executive 
branch, the actual check the Court would place on the Attorney General seems 
limited.  
Even if a case does not get reviewed by the Court or the Court shows strong 
deference, the federal circuit courts of appeals also place an imperfect check on 
the decisions of the Board and Attorneys General.222 Decisions by Attorneys 
General appealed to the circuit courts have in fact been rejected as failing the 
Chevron test.223 For example, in Matter of Silva-Trevino Attorney General 
Mukasey instituted a new test for moral turpitude upending a century old 
immigration law precedent.224 However, courts never uniformly accepted the 
                                                                                                                     
 217 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3 (2002). 
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Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)). The holding in Trump v. Hawaii provides 
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under Section 1182(f) of the INA. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408 (2018).  
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 223 Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 878; Holper, supra note 170, at 1243 (suggesting 
that courts should not apply Chevron deference to immigration adjudication decisions, but 
instead “apply Skidmore deference, a multifactor approach giving deference to the agency’s 
interpretation based on the thoroughness, consistency, and validity of its position”). 
 224 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688 (A.G. 2008). The term “moral turpitude” is 
term of art in immigration law. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), a crime of moral 
turpitude is one that a noncitizen was convicted of within five years and for which he could 
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new framework and in large part because of the role the circuit courts played.225 
Two circuit courts cautiously accepted the framework set forth in Matter of 
Silva-Trevino, but the majority found it to fail the Chevron test and ultimately 
rejected the framework.226 However, the lack of uniformity also points to the 
shortcomings of this option for reform: while some courts may reject an 
Attorney General’s decision, others may accept.  
Another option for reform comes by administration change and the possible 
regulations that a new administration could implement or decisions it could 
reopen. Pursuant to the INA, the Attorney General is “statutorily charged” with 
the “administration and enforcement of the immigration laws” and therefore can 
create regulations to reform the adjudication process.227 Furthermore, as 
evidenced by the Trump Administration, case certification serves as an 
opportunity to implement the administration’s immigration policy which may 
involve undoing the policy of administrations prior.228 This was also the case in 
Matter of Silva-Trevino, a decision by Attorney General Mukasey under the 
Bush Administration, which Attorney General Holder ultimately vacated under 
the Obama Administration.229 Still, this option requires an interested executive 
administration which leaves this option fairly unpredictable. 
Additionally, IJs and the Board remain formidable options for reform as an 
adjudicative body—even despite attempts to limit their authority. First, although 
their authority has indeed been limited as discussed above, they still retain much 
discretion in their decision-making.230 Second, the often-suggested option is to 
separate IJs and the Board from the Attorney General’s review to create a more 
independent adjudicatory process.231 For instance, the National Association of 
Immigration judges, a union of IJs, has advocated “for the creation of an 
independent Article I immigration court.”232 This approach “would make the 
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immigration courts independent of the Department of Justice and immune from 
possible political pressure from the Attorney General.”233 Thus, this approach 
might better achieve impartiality from decision makers, or at least the 
appearance of impartiality.234 However, this requires Congress to separate 
immigration adjudication from the DOJ and transfer it to an Article I Legislative 
Court.235 As commentators have acknowledged, there seems to be little political 
initiative from Congress or the Attorney General to take this approach.236 
Thus, reform through the courts or a change in presidential administration 
is uncertain, and despite any indirect checks on the referral authority, the Trump 
Administration demonstrates the potential for abuse that remains. As a result, 
the most effective way to prevent Attorney General abuse is through a statutory 
amendment to the INA.  
V. CONCLUSION 
While the referral authority offers an Attorney General a flexible means of 
rulemaking to implement executive policy, it has the potential for serious abuse. 
As used by an Attorney General, a political appointee, adjudication under the 
referral authority lacks neutrality, and thus threatens the due process rights of 
noncitizens. Its use under the Trump Administration has established this abuse. 
The uptick in the referral authority’s use has been used to limit IJ and the 
Board’s discretion and authority, while it has also further restricted the 
eligibility criteria for asylum and withholding of removal applicants. Many 
others have offered suggestions for reform, but only a statutory amendment 
relegating an Attorney General to notice-and-comment rulemaking, as opposed 
to adjudication, seems feasible. Therefore, in order to protect the interests of 
noncitizens and foster transparency in immigration law, the Attorney General 
should no longer be permitted to preside over individual immigration 
adjudications.  
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